- According to the authors' conversations with Ukrainian negotiators, Russia was very interested in Ukraine accepting a neutral position. In turn, the Ukrainian side insisted that it wanted to receive stricter security guarantees
- At the end of March 2022, Ukrainian and Russian negotiators produced a joint statement, which was the basis for a future peace agreement.
- But the negotiations ended in failure. Sarab and Ratchenko argue that this happened for four main reasons
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Russia attacked Ukraine on February 24, 2022, but four days later the two sides sat down at the negotiating table.. Sarab and Ratchenko argue that this happened because the Ukrainians feared that they would soon lose the war, while the Russians believed that their offensive did not bring immediate results and that they could extract concessions from Ukraine through diplomatic means.
Behind the scenes of negotiations between Russia and Ukraine
Negotiations began in Belarus on February 28, 2022. The Ukrainian delegation was led by David Arachamija, a close ally of Volodymyr Zelensky, and the Russian delegation was led by Vladimir Putin's adviser, Vladimir Medinsky. As described by Sarab and Ratchenko, during the first meeting, the Russians demanded the surrender of Ukraine.. The Ukrainians rejected this request, and the lack of Russian progress in the following days allowed them to negotiate more effectively.
During subsequent meetings – on March 3 and 7 – “the Ukrainian delegation presented its own demands: An immediate ceasefire and the establishment of humanitarian corridors that would allow civilians to safely leave the war zone.” According to the authors, a preliminary version of the joint statement was to be created on March 7, which became the basis. Russia was to demand Ukraine's neutrality in the peace agreement.
During remote meetings of the two representatives in March, Ukraine's demand for security guarantees in case of another Russian attack should be clarified. After the end of the Cold War, negotiations were held once (in 1994) on providing security guarantees to Ukraine, but they ended with signing. Budapest Memorandum. Although security guarantees were mistakenly believed to have been negotiated at the time, in reality they were only “assurances” and did not obligate the guarantor countries to provide arms assistance to Ukraine in the event of an attack.
Negotiations progressed in the last days of March in Istanbul. Later Russia and Ukraine announced that they had developed a common text of the statement, the so-called Istanbul Communiqué. Its contents have not yet been made public. But according to Sarab and Ratchenko – who had access to the document and spoke about it with the negotiating participants – the statement was written by the Ukrainian side, and the Russians accepted it as the basis for the subsequent peace agreement.
Under the agreement, “Ukraine will become a permanently neutral and non-nuclear state. Ukraine will renounce any intention to join military alliances or allow foreign military bases or troops on its territory.” – We study “Foreign Affairs”.
Ukraine would also receive security guarantees in the event of another attack. The guarantors would first consult with Ukraine and each other, and then offer assistance to Ukraine: introducing a no-fly zone, providing weapons, or intervening militarily on Kiev's side. Poland should be among the guarantors.
Also, there should be an open door for Ukraine to become a member of the European Union, “and the guarantor states (including Russia) will clearly affirm their intention to facilitate Ukraine's membership in the European Union,” we read in the text in the “FA.” In addition, the text of the report assumes that Russia and Ukraine will peacefully resolve the issue of the status of Crimea within 10-15 years.
Both Sarab and Ratchenko rate Russia and Ukraine were willing to make far-reaching concessions. Ukraine should adopt a neutral position (which Arachamiya later said was the most important issue in the Kremlin's eyes), and Russia should withdraw its opposition to Ukraine's membership in the EU and open the question of Crimea's membership. Previously considered closed.
The text of the statement, later modified in April 2022, became the basis for the peace agreement to be signed by Putin and Zelensky. In the following months. However, as Sarab and Ratchenko note, the text of the report did not include such important issues as the location of the border or the withdrawal of Russians from the occupied territories of Ukraine.
Why did the negotiations fail?
Sarab and Ratchenko estimate Four main factors contributed to the breakdown of peace talks in late April.
First, we read in FA that “Washington and other allies were deeply skeptical about the prospects for a diplomatic path out of Istanbul.” This is because the United States did not think the negotiations would succeed, and the Ukrainians did not consult Washington on the issue of security guarantees during negotiations with the Russians.
Under a future deal, the United States would be one of the guarantors — if necessary — to go to war with Russia. “Instead of engaging in the Istanbul process and subsequent diplomatic efforts, the West has increased military aid to Kiev and increased pressure on Russia, including an ever-tightening sanctions regime,” write Sarab and Ratchenko. They also point to Boris Johnson's visit to Kiev on April 9, when he convinced Ukrainians that a deal with Putin “would be a victory for Moscow.”
Second, the discovery of Russian war crimes in Bucha and Irpień contributed to the abandonment of peace talks. Nevertheless, talks have continued, but – as the authors argue – the climate for negotiations is not what it used to be.
Third, after the Russians withdrew from Kiev, Ukrainian officials were convinced that they could tilt the scale of victory in their favor with help from the West; But not at the negotiating table, but on the battlefield. As Sarab and Ratchenko remind us, in fact, at the end of April, Ukraine said that a Russian withdrawal from the Donbass would be a precondition for any deal. There was no mention of this in the earlier agreed exchange of information.
Fourth, as the authors argue, the negotiators erred by trying to craft an ambitious peace agreement instead of focusing on the important details first: the terms of the ceasefire, the demarcation of the border, and humanitarian corridors. Due to the general nature of the arrangements and the exclusion of the United States from this process (at the stage of preparing the report), Sarab and Ratchenko argue, the West, and above all Washington, decided not to engage in the diplomatic process.
In short, the authors argue, the results of negotiations in the first months of the war meant that Ukraine and Russia were already able to make relatively large concessions on the diplomatic table. “Thus, “If Kiev and Moscow ever return to the negotiating table, they may turn to a number of ideas that would be useful in building lasting peace,” the political scientists conclude..
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